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Set them (almost) free. Discretion in electoral campaigns under asymmetric information

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  • Vardan, Baghdasaryan
  • Elena, Manzoni

Abstract

The paper analyses a model of electoral campaigning as a problem of competitive delegation. We model a situation in which there is uncertainty about what the optimal policy should be and about the extent of candidates' bias. While voters know whether the candidate is left or right wing, the bias measures the extremity of the candidate. In this environment discretion may benefit voters as it allows the elected politician to adjust his policies to the state of the world. The paper shows that the optimal set of promises must be a closed interval, whose size is decreasing in the expected bias of the candidate. An example where the set of types is finite shows that an increase in the variability of candidates' types may either increase or decrease the level of discretion granted to politicians.

Suggested Citation

  • Vardan, Baghdasaryan & Elena, Manzoni, 2016. "Set them (almost) free. Discretion in electoral campaigns under asymmetric information," Working Papers 354, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 13 Dec 2016.
    • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:354
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Page, Benjamin I., 1976. "The Theory of Political Ambiguity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 742-752, September.
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    3. Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(4), pages 829-850.
    4. Glazer, Amihai, 1990. "The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 237-241, March.
    5. Alberto Alesina & Richard Holden, 2008. "Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002358, David K. Levine.
    6. Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Ambiguity in Electoral Competition," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 195-210, May.
    7. Adam Meirowitz, 2005. "Informational Party Primaries and Strategic Ambiguity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(1), pages 107-136, January.
    8. Tomz, Michael & Van Houweling, Robert P., 2009. "The Electoral Implications of Candidate Ambiguity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 83-98, February.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral campaigns; Ideological bias; Uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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