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Allocating Awards Across Noncomparable Categories

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  • Lonnie Magee
  • Michael R. Veall

Abstract

Suppose an agency awards a …xed number of prizes to applicants in different categories such that the applicant-to-winner ratio is constant by category. It is demonstrated in a simple theoretical model that the number of awards in a category will typically be positively related to the degree of applicant uncertainty. The theoretical …ndings are related to awards data from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Lonnie Magee & Michael R. Veall, 2002. "Allocating Awards Across Noncomparable Categories," Department of Economics Working Papers 2002-11, McMaster University.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2002-11
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    File URL: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/2002-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Paul M. Anglin & Ronald Meng, 2000. "Evidence on Grades and Grade Inflation at Ontario's Universities," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 26(3), pages 361-368, September.
    3. Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 21-43, Spring.
    4. Deborah Fretz & Michael R. Veall, 2001. "Economists and the ARC Large Grants Scheme: A Brief Report," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 77(237), pages 183-188, June.
    5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
    6. repec:bla:ecorec:v:77:y:2001:i:237:p:183-88 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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