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The Association Between Socio-Economic Characteristics and the Frequency of Wife Assault

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  • JoAnn Kingston-Riechers

Abstract

We estimate the impact of economic status on the frequency of domestic violence using several models and a large random sample. Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991) (TWL) find that both female and male income have a significant impact on the frequency of domestic abuse. We use a Zero Inflated Poisson model and a less self-selected sample of married women and find less evidence of a significant relationship between either female or male income and the frequency of abuse.

Suggested Citation

  • JoAnn Kingston-Riechers, 1998. "The Association Between Socio-Economic Characteristics and the Frequency of Wife Assault," Department of Economics Working Papers 1998-06, McMaster University.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1998-06
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    File URL: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/deptwp9806.pdf
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    1. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-137, May.
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    3. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    4. William H. Greene, 1994. "Accounting for Excess Zeros and Sample Selection in Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression Models," Working Papers 94-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "For Better or Worse: The Roles of Power in Models of Distribution within Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 148-152, May.
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