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Canadian Interest Rate Setting: The Information Content of Canadian and U.S. Central Bank Communication

Author

Listed:
  • Bernd Hayo

    (Philipps-University Marburg)

  • Matthias Neuenkirch

    (Philipps-University Marburg)

Abstract

We explain Canadian target rate decisions using macroeconomic variables as well as Bank of Canada (BOC) and Federal Reserve (Fed) communication indicators. Econometrically, we employ an ordered probit model of a Taylor rule to explain and predict 60 target rate decisions between 1998 and 2006. We find that communications, and most especially speeches and testimony by Canadian Governing Council members, provide a significant and robust explanation of Canadian target rate decisions. However, prior to the introduction of fixed announcement dates, Canadian communications contained more information on upcoming policy moves. Finally, communications by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank—which are much more frequent—outperform our Canadian communication indicators in explaining Canadian interest rate decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Hayo & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2009. "Canadian Interest Rate Setting: The Information Content of Canadian and U.S. Central Bank Communication," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200935, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:200935
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2012. "Managing financial market expectations: The role of central bank transparency and central bank communication," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-13.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2021. "Monetary policy and financial markets: evidence from Twitter traffic," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21160, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Oana Peia & Davide Romelli, 2024. "Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 365-388, April.
    4. Pang, Ke & Shiamptanis, Christos, 2024. "Is the Bank of Canada concerned about inflation or the state of the economy?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank of Canada; Central Bank Communication; Federal Reserve Bank; Interest Rate Decision; Monetary Policy; Ordered Probit Model; Taylor Rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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