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Loss Aversion in Contests

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  • Richard Cornes
  • Roger Hartley

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  • Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2012. "Loss Aversion in Contests," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1204, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    • Handle: RePEc:man:sespap:1204
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    File URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-1204.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sobel, Russell S & Garrett, Thomas A, 2002. "On the Measurement of Rent Seeking and Its Social Opportunity Cost," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 115-136, July.
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    3. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    4. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-110, March.
    5. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
    6. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1039-1061.
    7. W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat & Joel Huber, 1987. "An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(4), pages 465-479, Winter.
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    9. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26.
    10. Lisa Anderson & Beth Freeborn, 2010. "Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 237-254, April.
    11. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
    12. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 27-41.
    13. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    14. Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
    15. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
    16. Millner, Edward L & Pratt, Michael D, 1991. "Risk Aversion and Rent-Seeking: An Extension and Some Experimental Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 81-92, February.
    17. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2003. "Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 1-25, October.
    18. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    19. Schmidt, Ulrich & Traub, Stefan, 2002. "An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 233-249, November.
    20. Konrad, Kai A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1997. "Risk Aversion in Rent-Seeking and Rent-Augmenting Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1671-1683, November.
    21. Lisa Anderson & Beth Freeborn, 2010. "Erratum to: Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 255-256, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hoffmann, Magnus & Kolmar, Martin, 2017. "Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 120-139.
    2. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding And Heterogeneous Behavior In Contest Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 491-514, July.
    3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Joo Young Jeon & Abhijit Ramalingam, 2018. "Property Rights And Loss Aversion In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1492-1511, July.
    4. Keskin, Kerim, 2018. "Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 85-91.
    5. David Bruner & Caleb Cox & David M. McEvoy & Brock Stoddard, 2022. "Strategic thinking in contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 942-973, June.
    6. Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie, 2022. "Expectations-based loss aversion in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-27.
    7. Bettina Rockenbach & Sebastian Schneiders & Marcin Waligora, 2018. "Pushing the bad away: reverse Tullock contests," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 73-85, July.
    8. Hota, Ashish R. & Garg, Siddharth & Sundaram, Shreyas, 2016. "Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 135-164.
    9. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Information Disclosure in Contests with Endogenous Entry: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5128-5150, November.
    10. Stracke, Rudi & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sunde, Uwe, 2015. "Prevalence and Determinants of Choice Bracketing - Experimental Evidence," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113092, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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