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Threats and demonstrations of power: experimental results on bilateral bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Noemí Navarro

    (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)

  • Róbert Veszteg

    (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)

Abstract

We test the empirical effectiveness of threats in equilibrating bargaining power in simple bilateral bargaining games. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2001) and the bid-and-propose game (Navarro and Perea, 2005) that build on the ultimatum game and balance parties' bargaining power by auctioning the role of the proposer in the first stage. We show that, while both mechanisms implement the fair split in their subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium, they induce different results in the laboratory. Subjects do not react to threats that lie off the the equilibrium path in the expected way, even if these threats are theoretically credible as they belong to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In particular, it seems that subjects feel the need to show their bargaining power as if punishment that never happens could not constitute a credible threat.

Suggested Citation

  • Noemí Navarro & Róbert Veszteg, 2008. "Threats and demonstrations of power: experimental results on bilateral bargaining," Working Papers 2008-11, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Navarro, Noemí & Perea, Andrés, 2001. "Bargaining in networks and the myerson value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we016121, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    3. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    4. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
    5. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    6. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2003. "Is fairness used instrumentally? Evidence from sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 467-489, August.
    7. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    8. Card, David, 1990. "Strikes and Bargaining: A Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 410-415, May.
    9. Noemí NAVARRO & Róbert VESZTEG, 2007. "Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 07.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
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    Cited by:

    1. Priyodorshi Banerjee & Sujoy Chakravarty & Sanmitra Ghosh, 2016. "Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; experiments; fairness; Myerson value; ultimatum game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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