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Public-good experiments with large groups

Author

Listed:
  • Joachim Weimann

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

  • Jeannette Brosig-Koch
  • Heike Hennig-Schmidt
  • Claudia Keser
  • Christian Stahr

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

Many of real-world public-goods are characterized by a marginal per capita return (MPCR) close to zero and have to be provided by large groups. Up until now, there is almost no evidence on how large groups facing a low MPCR behave in controlled public-good laboratory experiments involving financial incentives. Connecting four experimental laboratories located in four di¤erent German universities via Internet, we are able to run such experiments. In ad-dition to the group size (60 and 100 subjects), we vary the MPCR which is as small as 0:02 or 0:04. Our data reveal a strong MPCR effect, but almost no group-size e¤ect. Our data demonstrates that, even in large groups and for low MPCRs, considerable contributions to public goods can be expected. Interestingly, the contribution patterns observed in large and very small groups are very similar. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one that includes large-group laboratory experiments with a small MPCR under conditions comparable to previous small-group standard public-good experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Weimann & Jeannette Brosig-Koch & Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Claudia Keser & Christian Stahr, 2012. "Public-good experiments with large groups," FEMM Working Papers 120009, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:120009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
    2. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Richard Benjamin, 2016. "Tacit Collusion in Electricity Markets with Uncertain Demand," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(1), pages 69-93, February.
    3. Richard Benjamin, 2016. "Tacit Collusion in Electricity Markets with Uncertain Demand," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(1), pages 69-93, February.
    4. Jahnke, Bjoern, 2015. "Tax morale and reciprocity. A case study from Vietnam," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-563, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    5. Goeschl, Timo & Kettner, Sara Elisa & Lohse, Johannes & Schwieren, Christiane, 2015. "What do we learn from public good games about voluntary climate action? Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Working Papers 0595, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    6. Daniele Nosenzo & Simone Quercia & Martin Sefton, 2015. "Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(1), pages 4-14, March.
    7. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
    8. Chen, Yefeng & Jiang, Shuguang & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2016. "The Tragedy of Corruption," IZA Discussion Papers 10175, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Bin Xu & C. Bram Cadsby & Liangcong Fan & Fei Song, 2013. "Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17, February.
    10. Hamet SARR & Mohamed Ali BCHIR & François COCHARD & Anne ROZAN, 2021. "Is the “average Pigouvian tax” robust to the size of the group of polluters?," Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 285-295, September.
    11. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 2017. "The role of frames, numbers and risk in the frequency of cooperation," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(3), pages 245-267, September.
    12. Rusch, Hannes, 2018. "Ancestral kinship patterns substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 105-115.
    13. Goeschl, Timo & Kettner, Sara Elisa & Lohse, Johannes & Schwieren, Christiane, 2020. "How much can we learn about voluntary climate action from behavior in public goods games?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    14. Hui-Chun Peng, 2022. "Effects of majority-vote reward mechanism on cooperation: a public good experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 989-1008, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

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