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Sharing the greenhouse: Inducing cooperation in a global common

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  • Damien S Eldridge

    (Department of Economics and Finance, La Trobe University)

Abstract

Global warming is an example of a global tragedy of the commons. The atmosphere is a global common property resource. The global nature of this resource makes global warming a particularly difficult problem to solve. The reason for this is that there is no world government that can introduce and enforce the standard solutions for common property resource problems in this case. Any solution will need to be voluntary, in the sense that each country must choose to participate in it. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the potential for repeated interaction between countries to induce them to cooperate in combating global warming.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien S Eldridge, 2008. "Sharing the greenhouse: Inducing cooperation in a global common," Working Papers 2008.07, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ltr:wpaper:2008.07
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperation; Global Warming; Gradual Commitment; Multiple Interaction; Prisoners Dilemma; Repetition; Tragedy of the Commons EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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