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Gestalt Justice. The Fusion of Emotion and Cognition in the Gestalt View of Justice

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  • Schlicht, Ekkehart

Abstract

The Gestalt view of ethics, as developed by the Gestalt psychologists in the middle of the 20th century, led to a particular theory of justice which avoided the shortcomings of other (emotive or cognitive) approaches. It took the rules of justice as being based ultimately on the fundamental laws of our psychological make-up.

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  • Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2001. "Gestalt Justice. The Fusion of Emotion and Cognition in the Gestalt View of Justice," Discussion Papers in Economics 76329, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:76329
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schlicht Ekkehart, 2000. "Aestheticism in the Theory of Custom," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.
    2. Smith, Adam, 1759. "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number smith1759.
    3. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    4. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1979. "The Transition to Labour Management as a Gestalt Switch," Munich Reprints in Economics 3388, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Field, Alexander James, 1984. "Microeconomics, Norms, and Rationality," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(4), pages 683-711, July.
    6. Schlicht, Ekkehart, . "Die emotive und die kognitive Gerechtigkeitsauffassung," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    7. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1998. "On Custom in the Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292241.
    8. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
    9. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1974. "Die Theorie der kollektiven Entscheidung und der individualistische Ansatz," Munich Reprints in Economics 3151, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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