IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lmu/muenar/19353.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Internationale Klimaschutzverhandlungen und sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik

Author

Listed:
  • Pittel, Karen
  • Rübbelke, Dirk T. G.

Abstract

Analyzing the rationale for climate policy, one utility category is often neglected: secondary benefits. This is surprising because the consideration of secondary benefits would increase the attractiveness of climate policies from a national point of view. It would however also affect the behavior of states in international negotiations on climate protection. On the basis of a chicken game, it is argued in this article that secondary benefits support national incentives to behave cooperatively. International cooperation in climate policies thus becomes more probable.

Suggested Citation

  • Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T. G., 2005. "Internationale Klimaschutzverhandlungen und sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik," Munich Reprints in Economics 19353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:19353
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barbara Buchner & Marzio Galeotti, 2004. "Climate policy and economic growth in developing countries: the impact of Kyoto," International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 4(1/2/3), pages 109-138.
    2. K. Aunan & H.E. Mestl & H.M. Seip & J. Fang & D.O'Connor & H. Vennemo & F. Zhai, 2003. "Co-benefits of CO 2 -reducing policies in China - a matter of scale?," International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 3(3), pages 287-304.
    3. Todd Sandler & Keith Sargent, 1995. "Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 71(2), pages 145-162.
    4. Charles B. Blankart & Christian Kirchner, 2003. "The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An Economic Analysis of Ways In and Ways Out," CESifo Working Paper Series 989, CESifo.
    5. Robert Ayres & Jörg Walter, 1991. "The greenhouse effect: Damages, costs and abatement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(3), pages 237-270, September.
    6. Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2002. "International Climate Policy to Combat Global Warming," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2723.
    7. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    8. Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdaït, 1996. "International bargaining in the presence of global environmental change," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(3), pages 293-314, October.
    9. Xander Olsthoorn & Markus Amann & Alena Bartonova & Jocelyne Clench-Aas & Janusz Cofala & Kees Dorland & Cristina Guerreiro & Jan Henriksen & Huib Jansen & Steinar Larssen, 1999. "Cost Benefit Analysis of European Air Quality Targets for Sulphur Dioxide, Nitrogen Dioxide and Fine and Suspended Particulate Matter in Cities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(3), pages 333-351, October.
    10. Rubbelke, Dirk T. G., 2003. "An analysis of differing abatement incentives," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 269-294, August.
    11. Ekins, Paul, 1996. "How large a carbon tax is justified by the secondary benefits of CO2 abatement?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 161-187, June.
    12. Oran R. Young, 2003. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 145-147, February.
    13. William R. Cline, 1992. "Economics of Global Warming, The," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 39, April.
    14. Markandya Anil & Rübbelke Dirk T.G., 2004. "Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy / Sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 224(4), pages 488-503, August.
    15. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    16. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    17. Knut Alfsen & Hugo Birkelund & Morten Aaserud, 1995. "Impacts of an EC carbon/energy tax and deregulating thermal power supply on CO 2 , SO 2 and NO x emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(2), pages 165-189, March.
    18. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1984. "Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(375), pages 580-598, September.
    19. repec:bla:scandj:v:94:y:1992:i:1:p:53-69 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Karen Pittel, 2002. "Sustainability and Endogenous Growth," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2776.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rubbelke, Dirk T.G., 2006. "Climate policy in developing countries and conditional transfers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(13), pages 1600-1610, September.
    2. Hubertus Bardt & Lars P. Feld & Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum & Wolfgang Buchholz & Dirk Rubbelke & Christian Hey & Karin Holm-Muller & Michael Weber & Rudiger Pethig & Joachim Weimann & Timo Goeschl, 2011. "Emissionsvermeidung oder Anpassung an den Klimawandel: Welche Zukunft hat die Klimapolitik?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(05), pages 03-29, March.
    3. Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T.G., 2008. "Climate policy and ancillary benefits: A survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 210-220, December.
    4. Dirk Rübbelke, 2005. "Foreign Aid and Global Public Goods: Impure Publicness, Cost Differentials and Negative Conjectures," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 151-173, June.
    5. Alfred Endres, 2008. "Ein Unmöglichkeitstheorem für die Klimapolitik?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 350-382, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T.G., 2008. "Climate policy and ancillary benefits: A survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 210-220, December.
    2. Finus, Michael & Rubbelke, Dirk T G, 2008. "Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2008-13, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
    3. Corradini, Massimiliano & Costantini, Valeria & Mancinelli, Susanna & Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2014. "Unveiling the dynamic relation between R&D and emission abatement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 48-59.
    4. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Valeria Costantini & Susanna Mancinelli & Massimilano Corradini, 2011. "Environmental and Innovation Performance in a Dynamic Impure Public Good Framework," Working Papers 201117, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    5. Massimiliano Corradini & Valeria Costantini & Susanna Mancinelli & Massimiliano Mazzanti, 2015. "Interacting innovation investments and environmental performances: a dynamic impure public good model," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 17(1), pages 109-129, January.
    6. Markandya Anil & Rübbelke Dirk T.G., 2004. "Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy / Sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 224(4), pages 488-503, August.
    7. Rubbelke, Dirk T.G., 2006. "Climate policy in developing countries and conditional transfers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(13), pages 1600-1610, September.
    8. Massimiliano Corradini & Valeria Costantini & Massimiliano Mazzanti & Susanna Mancinelli, 2014. "Linking innovation investment and environmental performance: an impure dynamic public good model," SEEDS Working Papers 0814, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Apr 2014.
    9. Andreas Löschel & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2009. "Impure public goods and technological interdependencies," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 36(6), pages 596-615, October.
    10. Kotchen, Matthew J., 2005. "Impure public goods and the comparative statics of environmentally friendly consumption," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 281-300, March.
    11. Michael Finus & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013. "Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 211-226, October.
    12. Cecere, Grazia & Mancinelli, Susanna & Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2014. "Waste prevention and social preferences: the role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 163-176.
    13. Karen Pittel & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2006. "Private provision of public goods: incentives for donations," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 33(6), pages 497-519, November.
    14. Anil Markandya & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2012. "Impure public technologies and environmental policy," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 39(2), pages 128-143, May.
    15. Anja Brumme & Wolfgang Buchholz & Dirk Rübbelke, 2023. "The purity of impure public goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 493-514, June.
    16. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    17. Alberto Longo & David Hoyos & Anil Markandya, 2012. "Willingness to Pay for Ancillary Benefits of Climate Change Mitigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(1), pages 119-140, January.
    18. Chan, Nathan W. & Kotchen, Matthew J., 2014. "A generalized impure public good and linear characteristics model of green consumption," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 1-16.
    19. Nathan Rive & Dirk Rübbelke, 2010. "International environmental policy and poverty alleviation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 146(3), pages 515-543, September.
    20. Kotchen, Matthew J., 2007. "Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 91-96, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:19353. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tamilla Benkelberg (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.