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Impure Public Goods and Technological Interdependencies

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  • Löschel, Andreas
  • Rübbelke, Dirk T. G.

Abstract

Impure public goods represent an important group of goods. Almost every public good exerts not only effects which are public to all but also effects which are private to the producer of this good. What is often omitted in the analysis of impure public goods is the fact that – regularly – these private effects can also be generated independently of the public good. In our analysis we focus on the effects alternative technologies – independently generating the private effects of the public good – may have on the provision of impure public goods. After the investigation in an analytical impure public good model, we numerically simulate the effects of alternative technologies in a parameterized model for climate policy in Germany.

Suggested Citation

  • Löschel, Andreas & Rübbelke, Dirk T. G., 2005. "Impure Public Goods and Technological Interdependencies," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-19, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:2909
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    Cited by:

    1. Costantini, Valeria & Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2012. "On the green and innovative side of trade competitiveness? The impact of environmental policies and innovation on EU exports," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 132-153.
    2. repec:gii:giihei:ciesrp:cies_rp_26 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Corradini, Massimiliano & Costantini, Valeria & Mancinelli, Susanna & Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2014. "Unveiling the dynamic relation between R&D and emission abatement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 48-59.
    4. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Valeria Costantini & Susanna Mancinelli & Massimilano Corradini, 2011. "Environmental and Innovation Performance in a Dynamic Impure Public Good Framework," Working Papers 201117, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    5. Mazzanti, Massimiliano & Zoboli, Roberto, 2009. "Environmental efficiency and labour productivity: Trade-off or joint dynamics? A theoretical investigation and empirical evidence from Italy using NAMEA," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 1182-1194, February.
    6. Nathan Rive & Dirk Rübbelke, 2010. "International environmental policy and poverty alleviation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 146(3), pages 515-543, September.
    7. Michael Finus & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013. "Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 211-226, October.
    8. Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T.G., 2008. "Climate policy and ancillary benefits: A survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 210-220, December.
    9. Giulio Cainelli & Massimiliano Mazzanti & Roberto Zoboli, 2011. "Enviromental Innovations, Complementarity and Local/Global Cooperation," Working Papers 201104, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    10. Massimiliano Corradini & Valeria Costantini & Susanna Mancinelli & Massimiliano Mazzanti, 2015. "Interacting innovation investments and environmental performances: a dynamic impure public good model," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 17(1), pages 109-129, January.
    11. Chiara Ravetti & Timothy Swanson & Mu Quan & Xuxuan Xie & Zhang Shiqiu, 2014. "Ancillary Benefits of GHG Abatement Policies in Developing Countries: A literature Survey," CIES Research Paper series 26-2014, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    12. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Antonio Musolesi, 2011. "Income and time related effects in EKC," Working Papers 201105, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    13. Cainelli, Giulio & Mazzanti, Massimiliano & Zoboli, Roberto, 2008. "The Relationship Between Environmental Efficiency and Manufacturing Firm’s Growth," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 46656, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    14. Massimiliano Corradini & Valeria Costantini & Massimiliano Mazzanti & Susanna Mancinelli, 2014. "Linking innovation investment and environmental performance: an impure dynamic public good model," SEEDS Working Papers 0814, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Apr 2014.
    15. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Antonio Musolesi, 2010. "Carbon Abatement Leaders and Laggards Non Parametric Analyses of Policy Oriented Kuznets Curves," Working Papers 2010.149, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    impure public goods; climate policy; rationing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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