IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuiedp/0323.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Organization of Production, Consumption, and Learning

Author

Listed:
  • Bryan Ellickson

    (Department of Economics, UCLA)

  • Birgit Grodal

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Suzanne Scotchmer

    (Department of Economics and GSPP, University of California, Berkeley)

  • William Zame

    (Department of Economics, UCLA)

Abstract

This paper provides an extension of general equilibrium theory that incorporates the actions of individuals both as demanders and suppliers of goods and as members of firms, schools, social groups, and contractual relationships. The central notion of the paper is a group: a collection of individuals associated with one another for some purpose. The model takes as primitive an exogenous set of group types, interpretable as (potential) firms, schools, social groups, contracts etc. The types of schools and firms that materialize in equilibrium, as well as the way that agents acquire skills, are determined endogenously in a competitive market, as are the contracts they enter into, and the production and consumption of private commodities. The model is well-founded (equilibrium exists) and passes a basic test of perfect competition (coincidence of the core with the set of equilibrium states). Examples and Applications illustrate the flexibility and power of the framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William Zame, 1999. "The Organization of Production, Consumption, and Learning," Discussion Papers 03-23, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Jun 2003.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0323
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2003/0323.pdf/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Ellickson, Bryan & Grodal, Birgit & Scotchmer, Suzanne & Zame, William R., 2001. "Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 40-77, November.
    3. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
    4. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    5. Ichiishi,Tatsuro, 1993. "The Cooperative Nature of the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521414449, January.
    6. Roland Benabou, 1993. "Workings of a City: Location, Education, and Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(3), pages 619-652.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jaime Luque, 2014. "Wages, local amenities and the rise of the multi-skilled city," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 52(2), pages 457-467, March.
    2. Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Core equivalence theorem with production," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 246-270, November.
    3. Luque, Jaime, 2013. "Heterogeneous Tiebout communities with private production and anonymous crowding," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 117-123.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William Zame, 2000. "A Theory of Firm Formation and Skills Acquisition," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0359, Econometric Society.
    2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    3. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2020. "On efficient firm formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-12.
    4. Luque, Jaime, 2013. "Heterogeneous Tiebout communities with private production and anonymous crowding," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 117-123.
    5. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2018. "Power at general equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(3), pages 425-455, March.
    6. Windsperger, Josef, 2001. "The fee structure in franchising: a property rights view," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 219-226, November.
    7. Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta, 2010. "Editors’ Introduction," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Surajeet Chakravarty & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Construction Contracts (or “How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?”)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1714, CESifo.
    9. Oliver Hart, 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-20, August.
    10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    11. Foss Kirsten & Foss Nicolai & Klein Peter G. & Klein Sandra K., 2002. "Heterogeneous Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Organization," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-20, March.
    12. Nathan H. Miller, 2008. "Competition When Consumers Value Firm Scope," EAG Discussions Papers 200807, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    13. Milchtaich, Igal & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 318-346, February.
    14. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 2000. "Formation of Nations in a Welfare‐State Minded World," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 157-181, April.
    15. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Book Review," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 535-542, September.
    16. Markus Solf, 2004. "Unternehmenskooperationen als Folge von Informations- und Kommunikations-technologieveränderungen: Eine theoretische Analyse," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 146-167, March.
    17. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2009. "Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evidence from Automobile Product Development," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 311-332, February.
    18. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    19. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
    20. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 145-166.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0323. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Hoffmann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/okokudk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.