Coordinated Strategic Manipulations and Mechanisms in School Choice
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005.
"The New York City High School Match,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
- Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," Scholarly Articles 2562765, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Bando, Keisuke, 2014. "On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 269-287.
- Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020. "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 370-390.
- Yajing Chen, 2017. "New axioms for deferred acceptance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 393-408, February.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023.
"When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
- Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 18/704, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Jaramillo, Paula & Kayı, Çaǧatay & Klijn, Flip, 2021.
"School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
- Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn, 2017. "School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms," Documentos CEDE 15611, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2017. "School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms," Documentos de Trabajo 15501, Universidad del Rosario.
- Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2017. "School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms," Working Papers 957, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2021. "Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 533-552, March.
- Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Inácio Bó & Bertan Turhan, 2023.
"Assignment maximization,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 123-138, February.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Turhan, Bertan, 2018. "Assignment maximization," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Mustafa Ou{g}uz Afacan & In'acio B'o & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Assignment Maximization," Papers 2012.01011, arXiv.org.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oguz & Bó, Inácio & Turhan, Bertan, 2020. "Assignment Maximization," ISU General Staff Papers 202001090800001092, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Claudia Cerrone & Yoan Hermstrüwer & Onur Kesten, 2024.
"School Choice with Consent: an Experiment,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 1760-1805.
- Cerrone, Claudia & Hermstrüwer, Yoan & Kesten, Onur, 2021. "School Choice with Consent: An Experiment," Working Papers 2021-09, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Feb 2022.
- Claudia Cerrone & Yoan Hermstrüwer & Onur Kesten, 2022. "School Choice with Consent: An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2022_02, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Jul 2023.
- Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021.
"How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 198-237.
- Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2018. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 18.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2018. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2019. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2018. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 114, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Author-Name: Christian Basteck & Author-Name: Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2021. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 21.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017.
"An invitation to market design,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017. "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers 2017-069, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014.
"School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
- Lars Ehlers & Isa Hafalir & Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed Yildirim, 2011. "School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Lars Ehlers & Isa Hafalir & Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed Yildirim, 2011. "School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E21, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- EHLERS, Lars & HAFALIR, Isa E. & YENMEZ, M. Bumin & YILDIRIM, Muhammed A., 2011. "School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds," Cahiers de recherche 2011-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lars Ehlers & Isa E. Hafalir & M. Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed A. Yildirim, 2011. "School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds," Cahiers de recherche 13-2011, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2013.
"Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-22, March.
- Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2010. "Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment," Harvard Business School Working Papers 10-093, Harvard Business School.
- Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz & Flip Klijn, 2015. "Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment," Working Papers 447, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2010. "Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 816.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2024.
"School choice with transferable student characteristics,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 103-124.
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez & Antonio Romero Medina, 2020. "School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2020-04, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
- Yuen Leng Chow & Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, 2015.
"Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales,"
Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 432-470, June.
- YuenLeng Chow & Isa Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, "undated". "Auctions versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E22, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Salem, Sherif Gamal, 2012. "Stability, efficiency and monotonicity in two-sided matching," MPRA Paper 37215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Atı̇la Abdulkadı̇roğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2022.
"Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 117-151, January.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2170R Publication Status:, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2020.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Angrist, Joshua & Narita, Yusuke & Pathak, Parag A., 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," IZA Discussion Papers 12205, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2020. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Papers 2101.01093, arXiv.org.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Working Papers 2019-024, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2170, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Troyan, Peter, 2024. "(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
- Haris Aziz, 2015. "A note on the undercut procedure," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 723-728, December.
- Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.
- Surender Baswana & Partha Pratim Chakrabarti & Sharat Chandran & Yashodhan Kanoria & Utkarsh Patange, 2019. "Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 49(5), pages 338-354, September.
- Kóczy Á., László, 2009.
"Központi felvételi rendszerek. Taktikázás és stabilitás [Central admission systems. Stratagems and stability],"
Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 422-442.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Központi felvételi rendszerek: Taktikázás és stabilitás," Working Paper Series 0901, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- James Boudreau & Vicki Knoblauch, 2013. "Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 565-589, April.
- Onur Kesten, 2012. "On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 677-693, November.
More about this item
Keywords
Matching; School choice; Strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness; Monotonicity; Deferred acceptance; Efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2022-06-20 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2022-06-20 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2022-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Office of Promoting Research Collaboration, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rikobjp.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.