The Effects of the Asymmetry of Information Intrafirms on Oligopolistic Market Outcomes
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
asymmetric information; incentive scheme; competition effort; oligopoly;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2007-04-09 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-04-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-04-09 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-04-09 (Microeconomics)
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