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Stakeholder Incentives and Reforms in China’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Common-Property Theory

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  • Richard Cornes
  • Todd Sandler
  • Jon Cauley

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  • Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler & Jon Cauley, 1998. "Stakeholder Incentives and Reforms in China’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Common-Property Theory," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 98/11, Department of Economics, Keele University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kee:keeldp:98/11
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raiser, Martin, 1997. "How are China's state-owned enterprises doing in the 1990s? Evidence from three interior provinces," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 191-216.
    2. Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, 1994. "Are Public Goods Myths?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 369-385, July.
    3. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
    4. Yang, Xiaokai, 1993. "Theories of property rights and China's reforms," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 195-212.
    5. Cauley, Jon & Sander, Todd, 1992. "Agency theory and the Chinese enterprise under reform," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 39-56.
    6. Rawski, Thomas G., 1997. "China's state enterprise reforms--n overseas perspective," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 89-98.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew J. Baker & Kurtis J. Swope, 2021. "Sharing, gift-giving, and optimal resource use in hunter-gatherer society," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 119-138, June.
    2. Min Zhu & Robert C. Camp & Maali Ashamalla & Raj Garg, 2007. "Comparison of Entrepreneurship Environment for Executives between State‐owned and Private Enterprises in China," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 15(6), pages 104-120, November.
    3. Cauley, Jon & Sandler, Todd, 2001. "Agency cost and the crisis of China's SOEs: A comment and further observations," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 293-297.
    4. Philipp Schröder, 2003. "Insider Privatisation and Restructuring Incentives," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 36(4), pages 333-349, December.
    5. Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2004. "Mixed sharing rules," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 196, Econometric Society.
    6. SIQUEIRA, Kevin & SANDLER, Todd & CAULEY, Jon, 2009. "Common agency and state-owned enterprise reform," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 208-217, June.
    7. Hao Shi, 2006. "L'évolution du "calcul économique en équipe" : un processus de légitimation des changements institutionnels en Chine," Working Papers 2006-4, Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion - université d'Orléans.
    8. Richard Cornes, 2016. "Aggregative Environmental Games," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 339-365, February.

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