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Group contest success function: The heterogeneous individuals case

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  • Osório, António (António Miguel)

Abstract

This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of the group contest success function in Münster (2009) to groups with heterogeneous individuals (e.g., individuals with different skills or different cognitive capacities). The obtained function allows for differences in terms of effort effectiveness between the group individuals and differences in terms of returns to scale at the aggregate level. Keywords: Group contests; Multi-issue contests; Success function; Heterogeneity; Characterization. JEL classi fication: C70, D72, D74.

Suggested Citation

  • Osório, António (António Miguel), 2018. "Group contest success function: The heterogeneous individuals case," Working Papers 2072/332583, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/332583
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Teoria de jocs; Decisió de grup; 33 - Economia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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