Strategic aspects of fighting in alliances
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- Kai A. Konrad, 2011. "Strategie Aspects of Fighting in Alliances," Working Papers strategie_aspects_of_figh, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Alliances; contests; conflict; in-group favoritism;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2012-01-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2012-01-25 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2012-01-25 (Game Theory)
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