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Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures

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  • Yukinori Iwata

    (Nishogakusha University)

Abstract

We investigate the strategic manipulation of two-stage voting procedures with the nomination process. First, some alternatives are nominated by aggregating voters’ opinions, which are positive or negative views about which alternatives are eligible as candidates for collective decision-making. Subsequently, the voting outcome is chosen from the set of nominated alternatives by aggregating the voters’ preferences. We extend the notion of strategy-proofness to the two-stage voting procedures and propose its weaker version, called opinion-based strategy-proofness. We show that a Gibbard–Satterthwaite-type impossibility is still valid, but that there exists an opinion-based strategy-proof two-stage voting procedure that is strongly efficient, non-dictatorial, strongly anonymous, and nomination stable.

Suggested Citation

  • Yukinori Iwata, 2023. "Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(4), pages 867-891, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:27:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-023-00327-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00327-9
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic nomination; Opinion-based strategy-proofness; Two-stage voting procedure; Strategy-proofness; Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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