Productivity in Contests: Organizational Culture and Personality Effects
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More about this item
Keywords
Tournaments; Organizational Culture; Personal Values; Teams; Economic Incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2010-07-31 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-07-31 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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