Reciprocity in the Principal–Multiple Agent Model
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2013-0022
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- Giuseppe De Marco & Giovanni Immordino, 2012. "Reciprocity in the Principal Multiple Agent Model," CSEF Working Papers 314, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2016. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- De Marco, Giuseppe & Immordino, Giovanni, 2013.
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- Giuseppe De Marco & Giovanni Immordino, 2010. "Partnership, Reciprocity and Team Design," CSEF Working Papers 257, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 24 Mar 2011.
- Mark T. Le Quement & Amrish Patel, 2018. "Communication as Gift-Exchange," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2018-06, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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More about this item
Keywords
reciprocity; many agents; psychological games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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