IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/jrp/jrpwrp/2007-010.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Parametric Contest Success Functions

Author

Listed:
  • Birendra K. Rai

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

  • Rajiv Sarin

    (Texas AM University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametric families of CSF’s. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends on the investments and a vector of parameters, where each parameter is specific to one of the contestants. In the second, the winning probabilities depend on investments and a scalar parameter common to all contestants.

Suggested Citation

  • Birendra K. Rai & Rajiv Sarin, 2007. "Parametric Contest Success Functions," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-010, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2007/wp_2007_010.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
    2. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    3. N/A, 2006. "Economic Overview," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 196(1), pages 2-3, April.
    4. repec:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:4:p:483-91 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    6. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    7. Martin Kolmar & martin.kolmar@unisg.ch & Andreas Wagener, 2012. "Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 79(1), pages 161-179, July.
    8. Luis C. Corchón, 2000. "On The Allocative Effects of Rent Seeking," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 483-491, October.
    9. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
    10. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    11. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-660, May.
    12. Nti, Kofi O., 2004. "Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1059-1066, November.
    13. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jeremy Petranka, 2009. "A Threshold Interpretation of the Ratio-Form Contest Success Function," Working Papers 2010-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Mar 2010.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Birendra Rai & Rajiv Sarin, 2009. "Generalized contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 139-149, July.
    2. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
    3. XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2014. "Contests with a Prize Externality and Stochastic Entry," Working Papers 14-19, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
    5. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2013. "Endogenous strength in conflicts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 297-306.
    6. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Reciprocity in the shadow of threat," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
    7. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
    8. Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang, 2009. "Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports," Working Papers 0105, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    9. Ansink, Erik, 2011. "The Arctic scramble: Introducing claims in a contest model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 693-707.
    10. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    11. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
    12. Satya R. Chakravarty & Bhargav Maharaj, 2014. "New contest success functions," Working Papers 340, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    13. Cedric Duvinage & Peter-J. Jost, 2019. "The Role of Referees in Professional Sports Contests," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(8), pages 1014-1050, December.
    14. Markus LANG & Alexander RATHKE & Marco RUNKEL, 2010. "The Economic Consequences Of Foreigner Rules In National Sports Leagues," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 31, pages 47-64.
    15. Luis Corchón & Matthias Dahm, 2010. "Foundations for contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 81-98, April.
    16. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Persuasion as a contest," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 465-486, October.
    17. André de Palma & Soumyanetra Munshi, 2012. "Multi-player, Multi-prize, Imperfectly Discriminating Contests," Working Papers hal-00683688, HAL.
    18. Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September.
    19. Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007. "The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August.
    20. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2020. "War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 998-1013.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contest success function; Axiomatization; Rent seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Markus Pasche (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.jenecon.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.