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Legal Corruption, Politically Connected Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Domadenik, Polona

    (University of Ljubljana)

  • Prašnikar, Janez

    (University of Ljubljana)

  • Svejnar, Jan

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

In this paper we present and test a theory of how political corruption, found in many transition and emerging market economies, affects corporate governance and productive efficiency of firms. Our model predicts that underdeveloped democratic institutions that do not punish political corruption result in political connectedness of firms that in turn has a negative effect on performance. We test this prediction on an almost complete population of Slovenian joint stock companies with 100 or more employees. Using the supervisory board structure, together with balance sheet and income statement data for 2000-2010, we show that a higher share of politically connected supervisory board members leads to lower productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Domadenik, Polona & Prašnikar, Janez & Svejnar, Jan, 2014. "Legal Corruption, Politically Connected Corporate Governance and Firm Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 8321, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8321
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matic Boro�ak & �tefan �umah, 2019. "The influence of demographic indicators on corruption perception in Slovenia," Academicus International Scientific Journal, Entrepreneurship Training Center Albania, issue 20, pages 81-92, January.
    2. Song, Yang & Yang, Jidong & Yang, Qijing, 2016. "Do firms' political connections depress the union wage effect? Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 183-198.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    politicians; productivity; corporate governance; corruption; state owned enterprises;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

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