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Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers

Author

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  • Bigoni, Maria

    (University of Bologna)

  • Camera, Gabriele

    (University of Basel)

  • Casari, Marco

    (University of Bologna)

Abstract

We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.

Suggested Citation

  • Bigoni, Maria & Camera, Gabriele & Casari, Marco, 2012. "Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers," IZA Discussion Papers 7051, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7051
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    2. Davide Dragone & Fabio Galeotti & Raimondello Orsini, 2017. "Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(5), pages 793-808.
    3. Radu Vranceanu & Fouad El Ouardighi & Delphine Dubart, 2013. "Coordination in Teams : A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment," Working Papers hal-00857364, HAL.
    4. Davide Dragone & Fabio Galeotti & Raimondello Orsini, 2015. "Students, Temporary Workers and Co-Op Workers: An Experimental Investigation on Social Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-45, May.
    5. Bigoni, Maria & Casari, Marco & Salvanti, Andrea & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2022. "It's Payback time: new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 16912, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Yohei Mitani, 2022. "Is a PD game still a dilemma for Japanese rural villagers? A field and laboratory comparison of the impact of social group membership on cooperation," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 103-121, January.
    7. Camera, Gabriele & Casari, Marco & Bigoni, Maria, 2012. "Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 570-586.
    8. Mongoljin Batsaikhan & Louis Putterman, 2019. "An Honest Day's Pay: Cooperation among Entrepreneurs vs. Students, and Linkages to Real‐World Business Success," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(2), pages 478-502, October.
    9. James Alm & Kim M. Bloomquist & Michael McKee, 2015. "On The External Validity Of Laboratory Tax Compliance Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 1170-1186, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    artefactual field experiment; peer punishment; prisoner's dilemma; non-standard subject pools; stranger matching;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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