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Enhanced Fee-for-Service Model and Access to Physician Services: Evidence from Family Health Groups in Ontario

Author

Listed:
  • Kantarevic, Jasmin

    (Ontario Medical Assocation)

  • Kralj, Boris

    (Ontario Medical Assocation)

  • Weinkauf, Darrel

    (Ontario Medical Assocation)

Abstract

We study an enhanced fee-for-service model for primary care physicians in the Family Health Groups (FHG) in Ontario, Canada. In contrast to the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) model, the FHG model includes targeted fee increases, extended hours, performance-based initiatives, and patient enrolment. Using a long panel of claims data, we find that the FHG model significantly increases physician productivity relative to the FFS model, as measured by the number of services, patient visits, and distinct patients seen. We also find that the FHG physicians have lower referral rates and treat slightly more complex patients than the comparable FFS physicians. These results suggest that the FHG model offers a promising alternative to the FFS model for improving access to physician services.

Suggested Citation

  • Kantarevic, Jasmin & Kralj, Boris & Weinkauf, Darrel, 2010. "Enhanced Fee-for-Service Model and Access to Physician Services: Evidence from Family Health Groups in Ontario," IZA Discussion Papers 4862, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4862
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Xue & Sweetman, Arthur, 2018. "Blended capitation and incentives: Fee codes inside and outside the capitated basket," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 16-29.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ontario; Family Health Groups; access to physician services; physician productivity; remuneration; primary care; Canada;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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