The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
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- Dulleck, Uwe & Rudolf, Kerschbamer & Matthias, Sutter, 2009. "The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition," Working Papers in Economics 348, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition," NCER Working Paper Series 42, National Centre for Econometric Research.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition," Working Papers 2009-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
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Citations
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- Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Qiu, Jianying & Sutter, Matthias, 2014.
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- Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Jianying Qiu, & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Car Mechanics in the Lab - Investigating the Behavior of Real Experts on Experimental Markets for Credence Goods," Working Papers 2009-27, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Jianying Qiu & Matthias Sutter, 2014. "Car mechanics in the lab: investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods," Economics Working Papers ECO2014/02, European University Institute.
- Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Jianying Qiu & Matthias Sutter, 2014. "Car Mechanics in the Lab - Investigating the Behavior of Real Experts on Experimental Markets for Credence Goods," Working Papers 2014-02, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Vincze, János, 2010. "Miért és mitől védjük a fogyasztókat?. Aszimmetrikus információ és/vagy korlátozott racionalitás [Asymmetric information and/or bounded rationality: why are consumers protected and from what?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 725-752.
- Gary Bolton & Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels, 2013.
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- Gary E. Bolton & Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels, 2009. "Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information," Discussion Papers 2009-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Gary Bolton & Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels, 2009. "Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information," Working Paper Series in Economics 42, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 22 Jan 2011.
- Loukas Balafoutas & Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2013.
"What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods,"
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- Balafoutas, Loukas & Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sutter, Matthias, 2011. "What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 5700, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Loukas Balafoutas & Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2011. "What drives taxi drivers? A field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods," Working Papers 2011-11, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Loukas Balafoutas & Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2011. "What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 3461, CESifo.
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- Brosig, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo, 2011. "Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions – An Experiment," Ruhr Economic Papers 254, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Qiu, Jianying & Sutter, Matthias, 2010.
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- Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Qiu, Jianying & Sutter, Matthias, 2010. "Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services: Theory and Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 4827, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Jianying Qiu & Matthias Sutter, 2010. "Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services - Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2010-06, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Huck, Steffen & Zhou, Jidong, 2011.
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- Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, 2009. "Natural Hazards Insurance in Europe - Tailored Responses to Climate Change Needed," Working Papers 2009-06, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2011. "The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 526-555, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
credence goods; experiment; liability; verifiability; reputation; competition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CNA-2009-03-14 (China)
- NEP-DEV-2009-03-14 (Development)
- NEP-EDU-2009-03-14 (Education)
- NEP-HRM-2009-03-14 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2009-03-14 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2009-03-14 (Transition Economics)
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