Public Implementation Eliminates Detrimental Effects of Punishment on Human Cooperation
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More about this item
Keywords
social norms; experiments; behavioral economics; punishment; public goods game; cooperation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2006-02-19 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2006-02-19 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-02-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-02-19 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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