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Age Structure of the Workforce and Firm Performance

Author

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  • Grund, Christian

    (RWTH Aachen University)

  • Westergård-Nielsen, Niels C.

    (Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

In this contribution, we examine the interrelation between corporate age structures and firm performance. In particular, we address the issues, whether firms with young rather than older employees are successful and whether firms with homogeneous or heterogeneous workforces are doing well. Several theoretical approaches are discussed with respect to these questions and divergent hypotheses are derived. Using Danish linked employer-employee data, we find that both mean age and dispersion of age in firms are inversely u-shaped related to firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Grund, Christian & Westergård-Nielsen, Niels C., 2005. "Age Structure of the Workforce and Firm Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 1816, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1816
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    firm performance; corporate age structures; demographic change;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

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