IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp17606.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do Stronger Employer Responsibilities Enhance Workplace Accommodation for Sick-Listed Workers? Evidence from a Dutch Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Jansen, Laura

    (University of Groningen)

  • Angelini, Viola

    (University of Groningen)

  • Groneck, Max

    (University of Groningen)

  • van Ooijen, Raun

    (De Nederlandsche Bank)

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of stronger employer responsibilities for facilitating work resumption of sick or disabled workers on employers' workplace accommodation efforts during sick leave. We exploit a reform in the Netherlands that altered experience rating – i.e., shifting the costs of sick leave and disability insurance to the firm – both for permanent and non-permanent employees. Using unique Dutch survey data on workplace accommodation of long-term sick-listed workers, we show that experience rating has no significant impact on accommodation efforts. Moreover, we provide evidence that the reform led to more firms opting for self-arranging both the sick leave benefits and the reintegration process of sick non-permanent workers, instead of using the public insurance scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Jansen, Laura & Angelini, Viola & Groneck, Max & van Ooijen, Raun, 2025. "Do Stronger Employer Responsibilities Enhance Workplace Accommodation for Sick-Listed Workers? Evidence from a Dutch Reform," IZA Discussion Papers 17606, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17606
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp17606.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kyyrä, Tomi & Paukkeri, Tuuli, 2018. "Does experience rating reduce sickness and disability claims? Evidence from policy kinks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 178-192.
    2. Hill, Matthew J. & Maestas, Nicole & Mullen, Kathleen J., 2016. "Employer accommodation and labor supply of disabled workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 291-303.
    3. Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2016. "Protecting working-age people with disabilities: experiences of four industrialized nations [Absicherung von Personen mit Erwerbsminderung: Erfahrungen aus vier Industrieländern]," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 49(4), pages 367-386, December.
    4. Kyyrä, Tomi & Tuomala, Juha, 2023. "The effects of employers’ disability and unemployment insurance costs on benefit inflows," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    5. Nicole Maestas & Kathleen J. Mullen & Alexander Strand, 2014. "Disability Insurance and Health Insurance Reform: Evidence from Massachusetts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 329-335, May.
    6. Nynke de Groot & Pierre Koning, 2022. "A burden too big to bear? The effect of experience‐rated disability insurance premiums on firm bankruptcies and employment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(1), pages 214-242, January.
    7. de Groot, Nynke & Koning, Pierre, 2016. "Assessing the effects of disability insurance experience rating. The case of The Netherlands," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 304-317.
    8. Pierre Koning, 2009. "Experience Rating and the Inflow into Disability Insurance," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 315-335, September.
    9. Nicole Maestas & Kathleen J. Mullen & Stephanie Rennane, 2019. "Unmet Need for Workplace Accommodation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(4), pages 1004-1027, September.
    10. Ossi Korkeamäki & Tomi Kyyrä, 2012. "Institutional rules, labour demand and retirement through disability programme participation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 25(2), pages 439-468, January.
    11. Pierre Koning & Paul Muller & Roger Prudon, 2022. "Why Do Temporary Workers Have Higher Disability Insurance Risks Than Permanent Workers?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-024/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Richard V. Burkhauser & J. S. Butler & Yang-Woo Kim & Robert R. Weathers II, 1999. "The Importance of Accommodation on the Timing of Disability Insurance Applications: Results from the Survey of Disability and Work and the Health and Retirement Study," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(3), pages 589-611.
    13. Burkhauser, Richard V. & Butler, J. S. & Kim, Yang Woo, 1995. "The importance of employer accommodation on the job duration of workers with disabilities: A hazard model approach," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 109-130, June.
    14. Nicole Maestas & Kathleen J. Mullen & Alexander Strand, 2014. "Disability Insurance and Health Insurance Reform: Evidence from Massachusetts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 329-335, May.
    15. René Böheim & Thomas Leoni, 2020. "Do Employees’ Sickness Absences React to a Change in Costs for Firms? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(2), pages 553-581, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kyyrä, Tomi & Tuomala, Juha, 2023. "The effects of employers’ disability and unemployment insurance costs on benefit inflows," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    2. Koning, Pierre & van Lent, Max, 2022. "Workers' Moral Hazard and Insurer Effort in Disability Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 15164, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Kim, Soojin & Rhee, Serena, 2018. "Measuring the effects of employment protection policies: Theory and evidence from the Americans with Disabilities Act," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 116-134.
    4. Nynke de Groot & Pierre Koning, 2022. "A burden too big to bear? The effect of experience‐rated disability insurance premiums on firm bankruptcies and employment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(1), pages 214-242, January.
    5. Lucie Schmidt & Lara D. Shore-Sheppard & Tara Watson, 2020. "The Impact of the ACA Medicaid Expansion on Disability Program Applications," American Journal of Health Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 444-476.
    6. Naoki Aizawa & Serena Rhee & Soojin Kim, 2018. "Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled," 2018 Meeting Papers 359, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Kyyrä, Tomi & Paukkeri, Tuuli, 2018. "Does experience rating reduce sickness and disability claims? Evidence from policy kinks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 178-192.
    8. Burkhauser, Richard V. & Butler, J. S. & Gumus, Gulcin, 2003. "Dynamic Modeling of the SSDI Application Timing Decision: The Importance of Policy Variables," IZA Discussion Papers 942, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Priyanka Anand & Purvi Sevak, 2017. "The role of workplace accommodations in the employment of people with disabilities," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 6(1), pages 1-20, December.
    10. Pierre Koning, 2016. "Privatizing sick pay: Does it work?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 324-324, December.
    11. Hassink Wolter H.J. & Koning Pierre & Zwinkels Wim, 2018. "Do Firms with Low Disability Risks Opt Out from Public to Private Insurance?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-11, January.
    12. Ghosh, Ausmita & Simon, Kosali & Sommers, Benjamin D., 2019. "The Effect of Health Insurance on Prescription Drug Use Among Low-Income Adults:Evidence from Recent Medicaid Expansions," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 64-80.
    13. Michael Levere & Sean Orzol & Lindsey Leininger & Nancy Early, "undated". "Contemporaneous and Long-Term Effects of Children's Public Health Insurance Expansions on Supplemental Security Income Participation," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 92d140d1a39741c481c4630bb, Mathematica Policy Research.
    14. Becky Staiger & Madeline Helfer & Jessica Van Parys, 2024. "The effect of Medicaid expansion on the take‐up of disability benefits by race and ethnicity," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(3), pages 526-540, March.
    15. repec:mrr:papers:wp341 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Heim, Bradley & Lurie, Ithai & Mullen, Kathleen J. & Simon, Kosali, 2021. "How Much Do Outside Options Matter? The Effect of Subsidized Health Insurance on Social Security Disability Insurance Benefit Receipt," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    17. Hill, Matthew J. & Maestas, Nicole & Mullen, Kathleen J., 2016. "Employer accommodation and labor supply of disabled workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 291-303.
    18. Garcia-Serrano, Carlos & A. Malo, Miguel, 2008. "The influence of disability on absenteeism: an empirical analysis using Spanish data," ISER Working Paper Series 2008-29, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    19. Kostas Mavromaras & Joanne Flavel, 2017. "An Analysis of the Impact of Health on Occupation," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 93, pages 86-104, June.
    20. Kyyrä, Tomi & Paukkeri, Tuuli, 2018. "Using a Kinked Policy Rule to Estimate the Effect of Experience Rating on Disability Inflow," Working Papers 105, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    21. Pinka Chatterji & Yue Li, 2016. "Early Effects of the 2010 Affordable Care Act Medicaid Expansions on Federal Disability Program Participation," NBER Working Papers 22531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    workplace accommodation; disability insurance; experience rating; employer incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17606. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Holger Hinte (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.