Do Firms with Low Disability Risks Opt Out from Public to Private Insurance?
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2017-0022
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- Nynke de Groot & Pierre Koning, 2022. "A burden too big to bear? The effect of experience‐rated disability insurance premiums on firm bankruptcies and employment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(1), pages 214-242, January.
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Keywords
public versus private insurance; disability insurance; opting out; longitudinal analyses;All these keywords.
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