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Social Harmony at the Boundaries of the Welfare State: Immigrants and Social Transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Epstein, Gil S.

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Hillman, Arye L.

    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

The social contract of the welfare state can be strained by the arrival of immigrants who receive welfare payments financed by citizens’ taxes. We show, however, that the presence of unemployed immigrants receiving welfare payments is consistent with social harmony. The social harmony, which is a consequence of a view of unemployment as a labor-market discipline, contrasts with the social conflict predicted by Karl Marx when he proposed his earlier version of the same explanation for unemployment. We demonstrate that a socially harmonious policy is always feasible. Outcomes without social harmony can therefore always be suitably amended.

Suggested Citation

  • Epstein, Gil S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2000. "Social Harmony at the Boundaries of the Welfare State: Immigrants and Social Transfers," IZA Discussion Papers 168, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Marie Grether & Jaime de Melo & Tobias Müller, 2015. "The Political Economy of International Migration in a Ricardo–Viner Model," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Developing Countries in the World Economy, chapter 17, pages 411-437, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Epstein, Gil S. & Weiss, Avi, 2001. "A Theory of Immigration Amnesties," IZA Discussion Papers 302, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Ira N. Gang & Myeong-Su Yun, 2007. "Immigration Amnesty and Immigrant's Earnings," Research in Labor Economics, in: Immigration, pages 273-309, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    4. Konrad, Kai A. & Andersson, Fredrik, 2001. "Globalization and Human Capital Formation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Nannestad, Peter, 2009. "Unproductive immigrants: A socially optimal policy for rational egalitarians," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 562-566, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social harmony; Welfare state; immigrants;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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