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Why Does the U.S. Have the Best Research Universities? Incentives, Resources, and Virtuous Circles

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  • MacLeod, W. Bentley

    (Princeton University)

  • Urquiola, Miguel

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

Around 1870 the U.S. had no research universities of note, while today it accounts for the largest number in the world. Many accounts attribute this transformation to events surrounding World War II. In contrast, this paper traces its origins to reforms that began in the 1870s. We first explain the origins of the American system's weakness at research. We then present an agency theory framework that highlights ingredients necessary for enhanced research performance. These include specialization and meaningful performance metrics. We then discuss reforms that put these ingredients in place. For example: the introduction of specialized and advanced teaching and the ensuing rise of disciplines/departments; the creation of academic journals; the introduction of selective admissions. Throughout, we emphasize the role played by the U.S. university system's free market orientation.

Suggested Citation

  • MacLeod, W. Bentley & Urquiola, Miguel, 2020. "Why Does the U.S. Have the Best Research Universities? Incentives, Resources, and Virtuous Circles," IZA Discussion Papers 13203, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13203
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    2. Bentley W. MacLeod, 2003. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 216-240, March.
    3. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, 1999. "The Shaping of Higher Education: The Formative Years in the United States, 1890 to 1940," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 37-62, Winter.
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    6. W. Bentley MacLeod & Evan Riehl & Juan E. Saavedra & Miguel Urquiola, 2017. "The Big Sort: College Reputation and Labor Market Outcomes," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 223-261, July.
    7. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-472, June.
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    12. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    13. W. Bentley MacLeod & Miguel Urquiola, 2015. "Reputation and School Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(11), pages 3471-3488, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kyle Myers & Wei Yang Tham, 2023. "Money, Time, and Grant Design," Papers 2312.06479, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    personnel economics; human capital; education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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