Delegation And Polarization Of Platforms
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More about this item
Keywords
Political Parties; Delegation; Polarization.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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