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- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Corchón

    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • M. Socorro Puy

    (Universidad de Málaga)

Abstract

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocationsobtained by any continuous sharing rule contains a subselection that is Pareto efficient. We alsopresent a mechanism that implements in Nash equlibrium the Pareto efficient allocationscontained in an arbitrary sharing rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Corchón & M. Socorro Puy, 2000. "- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-03
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2000-03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmeidler David & Tauman Yair, 1994. "Incentive-Compatible Cost-Allocation Schemes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 189-207, August.
    2. Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-93, August.
    3. Louis J. Billera & David C. Heath, 1982. "Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 32-39, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2009. "Cooperative production and efficiency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 143-154, March.
    2. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    3. Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 107-131, September.
    4. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    5. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing in Partnerships: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2005-05, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    6. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    7. Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency; Implementation; Sharing Rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises

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