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- Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences

Author

Listed:
  • Josep Enric Peris Ferrando

    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Mª Carmen Sánchez

    (Universidad de Murcia)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondence under different rationality assumptions (independence, neutrality, monotonicity, ...). It is well know in the literature that, under some of theses assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven ([7] and [10]); but no information about the social choice set is obtained. We now establish a relationship between the social choice set and the individual maximal sets which explicitly describes a fixed agenda social choice correspondence that satisfies theses rationality assumptions. Some of the results in [2] about the explicit representation of social decision functions are then translated and reinterpreted in the fixed agenda framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Mª Carmen Sánchez, 1998. "- Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1998-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1987. "Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 311-314.
    2. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-943, July.
    3. Denicolo Vincenzo, 1993. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 324-332, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fixed agenda; choice correspondences; explicit representation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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