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Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity

Author

Listed:
  • Michael McBride

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Gary Milante

    (World Bank)

  • Stergios Skaperdas

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

Abstract

We explore how peace or war can occur in the presence of commitment problems. These problems can be reduced by institutions of good governance or, alternatively, state capacity which (i) can be considered a collective good and (ii) can be improved through investments. We show how the likelihood of a peace agreement depends on the level of state capacity and on investments in state capacity made by adversaries. In accordance with existing evidence but contrary to various theories of conflict, we find that income levels unambiguously increase the chance of peace. Among other issues, we discuss the critical role of external actors in encouraging or discouraging commitment and in developing good governance institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael McBride & Gary Milante & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity," Working Papers 091002, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:091002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Proprietary Public Finance: On its Emergence and Evolution out of Anarchy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3495, CESifo.
    2. López Cruz, Iván G., 2019. "Policing, schooling and human capital accumulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 572-597.
    3. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    4. Arthur Silve, 2018. "Asset Complementarity, Resource Shocks, and the Political Economy of Property Rights," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(7), pages 1489-1516, August.
    5. Prasada, D.V. Pahan & Bose, Gautam, 2018. "Rational conflict and pre-commitment to peace," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 215-238.
    6. Silve, Arthur & Verdier, Thierry, 2018. "A theory of regional conflict complexes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 434-447.
    7. Nathan Canen & Jacob Schwartz & Kyungchul Song, 2020. "Estimating local interactions among many agents who observe their neighbors," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 917-956, July.
    8. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2015. "Trade openness and the settlement of domestic disputes in the shadow of the future," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 191-213.
    9. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2012. "Governance and Norms as Determinants of Arming," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 197-212.
    10. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "The costs of organized violence: a review of the evidence," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-23, March.
    11. Armey, Laura E. & McNab, Robert M., 2012. "Democratization and civil war," MPRA Paper 42460, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. McBride, Michael & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2014. "Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 75-89.
    13. Gautam Bose, 2023. "Contributing to Peace," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 67(10), pages 1993-2027, November.
    14. Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2017. "Coordination and culture," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 449-475, October.
    15. Bharat Goel & Arijit Sen, 2019. "Appropriative Conflicts and the Evolution of Property Rights," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    16. Philipp Denter & Dana Sisak, 2015. "The fragility of deterrence in conflicts," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 43-57, January.
    17. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2020. "Why did pre-modern states adopt Big-God religions?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 373-394, March.
    18. De Luca, Giacomo Davide & Lin, Xi, 2024. "The role of health and health systems in promoting social capital, political participation and peace: A narrative review," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    19. Cingolani L, 2013. "The State of State Capacity : a review of concepts, evidence and measures," MERIT Working Papers 2013-053, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    20. Laura Saavedra-Lux, 2024. "Quid pro quo: how the wartime economy shapes the violent contestation of the state after war," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2024-45, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    21. Parashari, Gopal Sharan & Kumar, Vimal, 2020. "Destruction and settlement norms as determinants of conflict: An evolutionary perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    22. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
    23. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2010. "Trade in the Shadow of Power," Working Papers 101105, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011.
    24. Antonis Adam & Petros G. Sekeris, 2010. "Self-Containment: Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings," Working Papers 1014, University of Namur, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutions; Conflict; Governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

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