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Inequalities under Ambiguity

Author

Listed:
  • Rocco Caferra

    (Unitelma Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy.)

  • Andrea Morone

    (University of Bari Aldo Moro, Bari, Italy.)

  • Piergiuseppe Morone

    (Unitelma Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy.)

Abstract

This paper explores the impact of risk and ambiguity on wealth redistribution, using an experimental dictator game. The findings show that wealth redistribution significantly declined in line with increased perceived risk, suggesting that heightened risk and ambiguity may reduce altruistic behavior. Gender differences in risk aversion were observed under conditions of risk (characterized by well-defined probability), but vanished under conditions of ambiguity. The study highlights the importance of risk perception in shaping social preferences and the potential use of ambiguity as a moral rationale to avoid engagement in pro-social behaviors and wealth redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Rocco Caferra & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2024. "Inequalities under Ambiguity," Working papers 115, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipu:wpaper:115
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pamela Jakiela, 2013. "Equity vs. efficiency vs. self-interest: on the use of dictator games to measure distributional preferences," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(2), pages 208-221, June.
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    6. Elena Cettolin & Arno Riedl & Giang Tran, 2017. "Giving in the face of risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 95-118, December.
    7. J. Michelle Brock & Andreas Lange & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2013. "Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 415-437, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dictator Game; Subjective Probability; Decision-Making; Experiment; Social Preferences; Risk Preferences; Ambiguity Box.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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