Competitive Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring
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Cited by:
- Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012.
"Impermanent types and permanent reputations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010. "Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations," Discussion Papers 1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Post-Print halshs-00754608, HAL.
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754608, HAL.
- Villatoro, Félix, 2009. "The delegated portfolio management problem: Reputation and herding," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(11), pages 2062-2069, November.
- Christian Ferreda & Matías Tapia, 2010. "Redistributive Taxation, Incentives, and the Intertemporal Evolution of Human Capital," Documentos de Trabajo 390, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
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More about this item
Keywords
reputation; incomplete information; perfect competition; general equilibrium;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2008-01-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2008-01-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2008-01-12 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2008-01-12 (Marketing)
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