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The Value of Institutions for Financial Markets: Evidence From Emerging Markets

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  • Mr. Thomas Stratmann
  • Mr. Bernardin Akitoby

Abstract

This paper investigates the value of political institutions for financial markets, using panel data from emerging market countries. We test the hypothesis that changes in political institutions, such as improvements in democratic rights and increased government accountability, have a direct effect on sovereign interest rate spreads. We find that financial markets value institutions over and above the economic and fiscal outcomes these institutions shape. Democracy and accountability generally lower sovereign spreads, political risk tends to increase them, and financial markets tend to view election years negatively.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Thomas Stratmann & Mr. Bernardin Akitoby, 2009. "The Value of Institutions for Financial Markets: Evidence From Emerging Markets," IMF Working Papers 2009/027, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2009/027
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    Cited by:

    1. Hartwell, Christopher A., 2014. "The impact of institutional volatility on financial volatility in transition economies : a GARCH family approach," BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2014, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    2. Eichler, Stefan & Plaga, Timo, 2020. "The economic record of the government and sovereign bond and stock returns around national elections," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    3. Sandile Hlatshwayo & Anne Oeking & Mr. Manuk Ghazanchyan & David Corvino & Ananya Shukla & Mr. Lamin Y Leigh, 2018. "The Measurement and Macro-Relevance of Corruption: A Big Data Approach," IMF Working Papers 2018/195, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Muhammad Asif Khan & Hossam Haddad & Mahmoud Odeh & Ahsanuddin Haider & Mohammed Arshad Khan, 2022. "Institutions, Culture, or Interaction: What Determines the Financial Market Development in Emerging Markets?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(23), pages 1-23, November.
    5. Patrick Carvalho, 2016. "Banking on Democracy: Financial Markets and Elections in Emerging Countries , by Javier Santiso ( MIT Press , Cambridge, MA , 2013 ), pp. xxxi + 317 ," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 92(297), pages 320-322, June.
    6. Sottile, Pedro, 2013. "On the political determinants of sovereign risk: Evidence from a Markov-switching vector autoregressive model for Argentina," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 160-185.
    7. repec:zbw:bofitp:2014_006 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Kim, Heeho & Cho, Seong-Hoon & Kim, Yongku, 2015. "Home bias, risk differential, and cultural spatial spillover effects," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 114-136.
    9. Jean-Louis Combes & Alexandru Minea & Pegdéwendé Nestor Sawadogo, 2019. "Does the composition of government expenditures matter for sovereign bond spreads' evolution in developing countries?," Working Papers halshs-02019063, HAL.
    10. Mariusz Jarmuzek & Mr. Tonny Lybek, 2018. "Can Good Governance Lower Financial Intermediation Costs?," IMF Working Papers 2018/279, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Christopher Hartwell, 2015. "Après le déluge: Institutions, the Global Financial Crisis, and Bank Profitability in Transition," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 497-524, July.
    12. Hartwell, Christopher A., 2018. "The impact of institutional volatility on financial volatility in transition economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 598-615.
    13. Kim, Heeho, 2011. "The risk adjusted uncovered equity parity," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1491-1505.
    14. Hartwell, Christopher A., 2014. "The impact of institutional volatility on financial volatility in transition economies: a GARCH family approach," BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2014, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    WP; spread; inflation rate; sovereign risk; spreads; institutions; financial markets; emerging markets; fiscal policy variable; country indicator; presidential system; spread index; default history; interest rates spread; debt ratio; government institution; Current spending; Inflation; Output gap; Housing; Global;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • H39 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Other
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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