Brazil: 2016 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Brazil
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Keywords
ISCR; CR; inflation expectation; policy; GDP; market condition; central bank's target; floating exchange rate regime; tolerance range; Fiscal stance; Inflation; Global;All these keywords.
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