IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/2016-190.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fragmented Politics and Public Debt

Author

Listed:
  • Ernesto Crivelli
  • Mr. Sanjeev Gupta
  • Mr. Carlos Mulas-Granados
  • Carolina Correa-Caro

Abstract

In this paper, we study the impact of fragmented politics on public debt—in particular, between two consecutive legislative elections. Using data for 92 advanced and developing countries during 1975-2015, we find a positive association between political fragmentation and public debt changes. Corruption magnifies the effects; with higher perceived corruption, political fragmentation has a bigger sway on debt increases. The influence of political fragmentation on debt dynamics is somewhat asymmetric, with larger and more significant effects during periods of debt reduction. Establishment of fiscal councils helps attenuate the negative impact of political fragmentation on public debt dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto Crivelli & Mr. Sanjeev Gupta & Mr. Carlos Mulas-Granados & Carolina Correa-Caro, 2016. "Fragmented Politics and Public Debt," IMF Working Papers 2016/190, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2016/190
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=44278
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Mauro, Paolo & Romeu, Rafael & Binder, Ariel & Zaman, Asad, 2015. "A modern history of fiscal prudence and profligacy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 55-70.
    3. Marco Battaglini, 2011. "The Political Economy of Public Debt," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 161-189, September.
    4. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2010. "Growth in a Time of Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 573-578, May.
    5. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
    6. Alesina, A. & Passalacqua, A., 2016. "The Political Economy of Government Debt," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2599-2651, Elsevier.
    7. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
    8. Friedrich Schneider & Andreas Buehn & Claudio Montenegro, 2010. "New Estimates for the Shadow Economies all over the World," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 443-461.
    9. Alberto Alesina & Matteo Paradisi, 2017. "Political budget cycles: Evidence from Italian cities," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 157-177, July.
    10. Friedrich Schneider & Andreas Buehn & Claudio E. Montenegro, 2011. "Shadow Economies All Over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007," Chapters, in: Friedrich Schneider (ed.), Handbook on the Shadow Economy, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    12. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
    13. Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
    14. Mr. Julio Escolano & Vitor Gaspar, 2016. "Optimal Debt Policy Under Asymmetric Risk," IMF Working Papers 2016/178, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Wehner, Joachim, 2010. "Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28648, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Marco Battaglini & Levon Barseghyan, 2011. "The Political Economy of Public Debt: A General Equilibrium Approach," 2011 Meeting Papers 1444, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Franzese, Robert J., 2005. "Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(4), pages 430-446.
    18. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
    19. Cooray, Arusha & Dzhumashev, Ratbek & Schneider, Friedrich, 2017. "How Does Corruption Affect Public Debt? An Empirical Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 115-127.
    20. Gupta, Sanjeev & de Mello, Luiz & Sharan, Raju, 2001. "Corruption and military spending," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 749-777, November.
    21. Xavier Debrun & Tidiane Kinda, 2017. "Strengthening Post‐Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise – A New Dataset," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 38, pages 667-700, December.
    22. Baunsgaard, Thomas & Keen, Michael, 2010. "Tax revenue and (or?) trade liberalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 563-577, October.
    23. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 1-28, April.
    24. Baldacci, Emanuele & Clements, Benedict & Gupta, Sanjeev & Cui, Qiang, 2008. "Social Spending, Human Capital, and Growth in Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1317-1341, August.
    25. Perotti, Roberto & Kontopoulos, Yianos, 2002. "Fragmented fiscal policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 191-222, November.
    26. S. Rao Aiyagari & Albert Marcet & Thomas J. Sargent & Juha Seppala, 2002. "Optimal Taxation without State-Contingent Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1220-1254, December.
    27. MacIntyre, Andrew, 2001. "Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 81-122, January.
    28. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 289-325, July.
    29. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Apergis, Nicholas & Pinar, Mehmet, 2021. "The role of party polarization in renewable energy consumption: Fresh evidence across the EU countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    2. João Tovar Jalles, 2021. "Promised Fiscal Expansions and Politics: A European Union Assessment," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(1), pages 84-116, March.
    3. Samba Mbaye & Ms. Marialuz Moreno Badia & Kyungla Chae, 2018. "Bailing Out the People? When Private Debt Becomes Public," IMF Working Papers 2018/141, International Monetary Fund.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alesina, A. & Passalacqua, A., 2016. "The Political Economy of Government Debt," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2599-2651, Elsevier.
    2. Boll, David & Sidki, Marcus, 2021. "The influence of political fragmentation on public enterprises: Evidence from German municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    3. Simon Berset & Martin Huber & Mark Schelker, 2023. "The fiscal response to revenue shocks," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(3), pages 814-848, June.
    4. Nouha Bougharriou, 2017. "Understanding Public Debt from a Political Economy Perspective," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 3, pages 379-389, September.
    5. Qamar Abbas & Li Junqing & Muhammad Ramzan & Sumbal Fatima, 2021. "Role of Governance in Debt-Growth Relationship: Evidence from Panel Data Estimations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-19, May.
    6. Marcela Eslava, 2011. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 645-673, September.
    7. Heiner Felix Mikosch & Silke Übelmesser, 2007. "Staatsverschuldungsunterschiede im internationalen Vergleich und Schlussfolgerungen für Deutschland," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(4), pages 309-334, November.
    8. Alfredo Monte & Luca Pennacchio, 2020. "Corruption, Government Expenditure and Public Debt in OECD Countries," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 62(4), pages 739-771, December.
    9. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 583-610, November.
    11. Panizza, Ugo & Fatás, Antonio & Ghosh, Atish R. & ,, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," CEPR Discussion Papers 13735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
    13. Stefanie Vanneste & Stijn Goeminne, 2020. "The role of the past in public policy: empirical evidence of the long-term effect of past policy and politics on the local budget balance," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 75-99, March.
    14. Alfredo Monte & Luca Pennacchio, 0. "Corruption, Government Expenditure and Public Debt in OECD Countries," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 0, pages 1-33.
    15. Eunji Kim & Yoonhee Ha & Sangheon Kim, 2017. "Public Debt, Corruption and Sustainable Economic Growth," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-30, March.
    16. Ben Ali Tarek & Zidi Ahmed, 2017. "Institutional Quality and Public Debt Accumulation: An Empirical Analysis," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 415-435, July.
    17. Woo, Jaejoon, 2003. "Economic, political, and institutional determinants of public deficits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 387-426, March.
    18. Maria Manuel Pinho, 2004. "Political models of budget deficits: a literature review," FEP Working Papers 138, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    19. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    20. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2016/190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Akshay Modi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.