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Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße

Author

Listed:
  • Roman Inderst

    (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/Main)

  • Frank Maier-Rigaud

    (IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS))

  • Ulrich Schwalbe

    (Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Hohenheim)

Abstract

Eine ökonomisch fundierte Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Verstöße gegen das Wettbewerbsrecht hat in den letzten Jahren, vor allem im Zuge der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, erheblich an Bedeutung gewonnen. Wenn ein Schaden vor Gericht geltend gemacht und eine Kompensation des entstandenen Schadens eingefordert wird, so ist hierfür die Höhe des erlittenen Schadens zu quantifizieren. Derartige Schadensersatzforderungen werden in jüngster Zeit immer häufiger erhoben und es ist damit zu rechnen, dass sich dieser Trend auch künftig fortsetzen wird. Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, eine allgemein verständliche Einführung in die ökonomischen Konzepte und Methoden zur Ermittlung und Bewertung von Schäden zu geben, die durch Verletzungen des Wettbewerbsrechts entstanden sind, wobei das europäische sowie das deutsche Wettbewerbsrecht im Vordergrund stehen.

Suggested Citation

  • Roman Inderst & Frank Maier-Rigaud & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2013. "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," Working Papers 2013-ECO-08, IESEG School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:ies:wpaper:e201308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frank Maier-Rigaud & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2013. "Quantification of Antitrust Damages," Working Papers 2013-ECO-09, IESEG School of Management.
    2. Roman Inderst & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2014. "Umbrella Effects," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 739-763.
    3. Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 2014. "Toward A European Directive On Damages Actions," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 341-360.
    4. Welter, Dominik & Napel, Stefan, 2016. "Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145886, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Doose, Anna Maria, 2013. "Methods for calculating cartel damages: A survey," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 83, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

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