The Informational Role of Prices
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2019. "The Informational Role of Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(2), pages 606-629, April.
References listed on IDEAS
- Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995.
"Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992. "Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling," Working Papers 94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling," Game Theory and Information 9403007, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Mar 1994.
- Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002.
"Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 907-930, September.
- Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "Advertising and Prices as Signals of Quality in a Regime of Price Rivalry," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9903, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980.
"On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
- Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986.
"Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
- Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 709, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Kenneth L. Judd & Michael H. Riordan, 1994. "Price and Quality in a New Product Monopoly," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(4), pages 773-789.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 973-989, December.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0703, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Matthews, Steven A & Mirman, Leonard J, 1983.
"Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 981-996, July.
- Steven A. Matthews & Leonard J. Mirman, 1981. "Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand," Discussion Papers 494, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Imperfect competition and quality signalling,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0520, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Mirman, Leonard J. & Salgueiro, Egas M. & Santugini, Marc, 2014.
"Noisy signaling in monopoly,"
International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 504-511.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Egas Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2011. "Noisy Signaling in Monopoly," Cahiers de recherche 11-03, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée, revised May 2013.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Egas M. Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2015. "Noisy Learning in a Competitive Market with Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 1502, CIRPEE.
- Grossman, Sanford J, 1976. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades Have Diverse Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 573-585, May.
- Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007.
"Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 94-120, January.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0417, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford, 1978.
"Further results on the informational efficiency of competitive stock markets,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 81-101, June.
- Sanford Grossman, 1978. "Further results on the informational efficiency of competitive stock markets," Special Studies Papers 114, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Roy, Santanu, 2010.
"Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 192-207, January.
- Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2007. "Signaling Quality Through Prices in an Oligopoly," Departmental Working Papers 0709, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
- Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2007. "Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-081/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991.
"High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
- Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan, 1988. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," Discussion Papers 808, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Yaron Yehezkel, 2008. "Signaling Quality in an Oligopoly When Some Consumers Are Informed," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(4), pages 937-972, December.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1983. "Prices as Signals of Product Quality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 647-658.
- Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J. & Santugini, Marc, 2012.
"Information in Cournot: Signaling with incomplete control,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 361-370.
- Wassim DAHER & Leonard J. MIRMAN & Marc Santugini, 2009. "Information in Cournot: Signaling with Incomplete Control," Cahiers de recherche 09-09, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée, revised Nov 2011.
- Michael H. Riordan, 1986. "Monopolistic Competition with Experience Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 265-279.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Egas M. Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2014. "Learning in a Perfectly Competitive Market," Cahiers de recherche 1423, CIRPEE.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2011. "The Simple Analytics of Price Signaling Quality," Cahiers de recherche 11-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Mandeya Shelton M.T & Ho Sin-Yu, 2022. "Inflation, Inflation Uncertainty and the Economic Growth Nexus: A Review of the Literature," Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia, Sciendo, vol. 22(1), pages 172-190, June.
- Mirman, Leonard J. & Salgueiro, Egas M. & Santugini, Marc, 2014.
"Noisy signaling in monopoly,"
International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 504-511.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Egas Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2011. "Noisy Signaling in Monopoly," Cahiers de recherche 11-03, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée, revised May 2013.
- Minghua Chen & Konstantinos Serfes & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2023. "Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 1-31, March.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Mirman, Leonard J. & Salgueiro, Egas M. & Santugini, Marc, 2014.
"Noisy signaling in monopoly,"
International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 504-511.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Egas Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2011. "Noisy Signaling in Monopoly," Cahiers de recherche 11-03, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée, revised May 2013.
- Catherine Gendron-Saulnier & Marc Santugini, 2013. "The Informational Benefit of Price Discrimination," Cahiers de recherche 13-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J. & Santugini, Marc, 2012.
"Information in Cournot: Signaling with incomplete control,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 361-370.
- Wassim DAHER & Leonard J. MIRMAN & Marc Santugini, 2009. "Information in Cournot: Signaling with Incomplete Control," Cahiers de recherche 09-09, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée, revised Nov 2011.
- Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2017. "Pricing an Experience Composite Good as Coordinated Signals," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(2), pages 163-182, March.
- Bester, Helmut & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2001.
"Strategic pricing, signalling, and costly information acquisition,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(9), pages 1347-1361, November.
- Helmut Bester & Klaus Ritzberger, "undated". "Strategic Pricing, Signalling, and Costly Information Acquisition," Papers 008, Departmental Working Papers.
- Bester, Helmut & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998. "Strategic Pricing, Signalling and Costly Information Acquisition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2032, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eric Schmidbauer, 2016. "New and Improved?," Working Papers 2016-02, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
- Helmut Bester & Juri Demuth, 2015.
"Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 135-154, June.
- Bester, Helmut & Demuth, Juri, 2011. "Signalling rivalry and quality uncertainty in a duopoly," Discussion Papers 2011/20, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Demuth, Juri, 2013. "Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 400, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Cheating," Working Papers 683, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Minghua Chen & Konstantinos Serfes & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2023. "Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 1-31, March.
- Schmidbauer, Eric & Lubensky, Dmitry, 2018. "New and improved?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 26-48.
- P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Compliance," Working Papers 682, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Li, Jianpei & Zhang, Wanzhu, 2022. "Behavior-based pricing and signaling of product quality," MPRA Paper 120263, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Jan 2023.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Imperfect competition and quality signalling,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0520, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2011. "The Simple Analytics of Price Signaling Quality," Cahiers de recherche 11-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 973-989, December.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0703, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Regulating False Discloure," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168159, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 106-126, March.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0625, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Eric Schmidbauer, 2013. "New and Improved?," Working Papers 2013-01, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Berg, Nathan, 2017.
"Reexamining the Schmalensee effect,"
Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 11, pages 1-12.
- Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2017. "Reexamining the Schmalensee effect," Economics Discussion Papers 2017-3, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Yongmin Chen & Xinyu Hua, 2017.
"Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 237-267.
- Chen, Yongmin & Hua, Xinyu, 2015. "Competition, product safety, and product liability," MPRA Paper 66450, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric information; Dominant Firm with Fringe Competition; Informational externality; Learning; Quality; Signaling.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2008-10-07 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-COM-2008-10-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2008-10-07 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2008-10-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2008-10-07 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2008-10-07 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MST-2008-10-07 (Market Microstructure)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0809. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patricia Power (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iehecca.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.