Competition, Reputation and Compliance
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002.
"Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 907-930, September.
- Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "Advertising and Prices as Signals of Quality in a Regime of Price Rivalry," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9903, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Mark N. Hertzendorf & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2001. "Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 621-662, December.
- Helmut Bester, 1998. "Quality Uncertainty Mitigates Product Differentiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 828-844, Winter.
- Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007.
"Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 94-120, January.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0417, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991.
"High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
- Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan, 1988. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," Discussion Papers 808, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Cheating," Working Papers 683, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Imperfect competition and quality signalling,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0520, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
- Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1984. "Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: The Competitive Case," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(2), pages 197-207.
- Franklin Allen, 1984. "Reputation and Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 311-327, Autumn.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986.
"Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
- Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 709, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1994. "Equilibrium effects of potential entry when prices signal quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 367-383, February.
- Yaron Yehezkel, 2008. "Signaling Quality in an Oligopoly When Some Consumers Are Informed," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(4), pages 937-972, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Cheating," Working Papers 683, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Cheating," Working Papers 683, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 973-989, December.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0703, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Quality-Ensuring Profits," Working Papers 2008-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 106-126, March.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0625, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008.
"Imperfect competition and quality signalling,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0520, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Helmut Bester & Juri Demuth, 2015.
"Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 135-154, June.
- Bester, Helmut & Demuth, Juri, 2011. "Signalling rivalry and quality uncertainty in a duopoly," Discussion Papers 2011/20, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Demuth, Juri, 2013. "Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 400, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2011.
"Competition and the signaling role of prices,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 412-425, July.
- Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca, 2008. "Competition and the signaling role of prices," MPRA Paper 16108, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- LG Deidda & F. Adriani, 2010. "Competition and the signaling role of prices," Working Paper CRENoS 201012, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Roy, Santanu, 2010.
"Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 192-207, January.
- Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2007. "Signaling Quality Through Prices in an Oligopoly," Departmental Working Papers 0709, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
- Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2007. "Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-081/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Eric Schmidbauer, 2016. "New and Improved?," Working Papers 2016-02, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
- Minghua Chen & Konstantinos Serfes & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2023. "Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 1-31, March.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015.
"Industrial Organization,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107069978, September.
- Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007.
"Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 94-120, January.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0417, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Schmidbauer, Eric & Lubensky, Dmitry, 2018. "New and improved?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 26-48.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2019.
"The Informational Role of Prices,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(2), pages 606-629, April.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2008. "The Informational Role of Prices," Cahiers de recherche 08-09, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée, revised Apr 2014.
- Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995.
"Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992. "Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling," Working Papers 94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling," Game Theory and Information 9403007, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Mar 1994.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2023.
"Competition in costly talk,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers 2103.05317, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Rasmusen, Eric, 2017. "A model of trust in quality and North–South trade," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 159-170.
- Fulan Wu, 2017. "Signaling Unobservable Quality Choice through Price and Advertising: The Case with Competing Firms," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(2), pages 243-260, March.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2021.
"Competition in Signaling,"
MPRA Paper
106071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Federico Vaccari, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," Working Papers 2022.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," FEEM Working Papers 329582, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Buehler, Benno & Schuett, Florian, 2014.
"Certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 493-511.
- Buehler, B. & Schuett, F., 2012. "Certification and Minimum Quality Standards when Some Consumers are Uninformed," Discussion Paper 2012-040, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Buehler, B. & Schuett, F., 2012. "Certification and Minimum Quality Standards when Some Consumers are Uninformed," Other publications TiSEM d181488a-ea27-42f7-a2e7-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2009-12-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2009-12-05 (Industrial Organization)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:682. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sebolit.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.