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Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions

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  • De Donder, Philippe

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  • De Donder, Philippe, 2010. "Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions," IDEI Working Papers 693, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:25346
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
    2. Russo, Antonio, 2013. "Voting on road congestion policy," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 707-724.
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    Cited by:

    1. De Donder, Philippe, 2013. "Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 523-525.

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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