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The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment in the UK: The Case of Telecommunications

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo T. Spiller
  • Ingo Vogelsang

Abstract

This paper tries to solve the following puzzle. Given that UK governments have, in principle, so much administrative discretion, how were the Conservative governments of the 1980s able to privatize the telecommunications, electricity, water, gas, and airport sectors so prone for administrative expropriation? The answer resides in the subtle use of processes and other institutional arrangements that limit regulatory discretion. We model these processes and contrast the workings of our model to the evolution of regulation in te UK telecommunications sector. Under simple assumptions about preferences of the relevant players, the model is consistent with the evolution of telecommunications regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo T. Spiller & Ingo Vogelsang, 1997. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment in the UK: The Case of Telecommunications," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(4), pages 607-607, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199712)153:4_607:tiforc_2.0.tx_2-n
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jamison, Mark A., 2005. "Leadership and the independent regulator," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3620, The World Bank.
    2. Spiller, Pablo T., 2013. "Transaction cost regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 232-242.
    3. Jean‐Michel Glachant, 2008. "La Deregulation Des Industries De Reseaux Comme Politique Institutionnelle De Creation De Marches Et De Mecanismes De Gouvernance," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 487-525, September.
    4. D. Finon & F. Roques, 2008. "Financing Arrangements and Industrial Organisation for New Nuclear Build in Electricity Markets," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 9(3), pages 247-282, September.
    5. Perez, Yannick & Ramos-Real, Francisco Javier, 2009. "The public promotion of wind energy in Spain from the transaction costs perspective 1986-2007," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 1058-1066, June.
    6. Yannick Perez, 2005. "'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation," Global Business and Economics Review, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 7(2/3), pages 278-291.
    7. Paul Levine & Paul Levine & Jon Stern & Francesc Trillas, 2003. "Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons from Monetary Policy," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0403, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    8. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
    9. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    10. Urbiztondo, Santiago & Navajas, Fernando & Artana, Daniel, 1998. "La autonomía de los entes reguladores argentinos: Agua y cloacas, gas natural, energía eléctrica y telecomunicaciones," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6118, Inter-American Development Bank.
    11. Howell, Bronwyn & Sadowski, Bert, 2018. "Anatomy of a public-private partnership: Hold-up and regulatory commitment in Ultrafast Broadband," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 552-565.
    12. Glachant, Jean-Michel & Dubois, Ute & Perez, Yannick, 2008. "Deregulating with no regulator: Is the German electricity transmission regime institutionally correct?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1600-1610, May.
    13. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2004. "Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 712-729, June.
    14. Shane M. Greenstein & Pablo T. Spiller, 1996. "Estimating the Welfare Effects of Digital Infrastructure," NBER Working Papers 5770, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Lars Kumkar, 2003. "Regulatory Choices and Commitment: Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 91-115.
    16. Michel, GHERTMAN, 1998. "Applications pratiques de la théorie des coûts de transaction," HEC Research Papers Series 636, HEC Paris.
    17. Laura Abrardi & Cambini Carlo & Rondi Laura, 2018. "The Impact of Regulation on Utilities’ Investments: A Survey and New Evidence from the Energy Industry," De Economist, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 41-62, March.
    18. Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi, 2017. "Independent Agencies, Political Interference, And Firm Investment: Evidence From The European Union," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 281-304, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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