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Protecting Workers against Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Argentina

Author

Listed:
  • González Rozada, Martín
  • Ronconi, Lucas
  • Ruffo, Hernán

Abstract

This paper takes advantage of several reforms that provide time and cross sectional variation to identify the effects of unemployment insurance and severance payments on the duration of unemployment and on the separation probability in Argentina. Administrative data permits analysis of the duration of unemployment of covered spells with detailed information about transfers and their duration, while household surveys permit the study of separation probability and transitions to informal jobs, which are not observed in administrative data. It is found that unemployment duration increases significantly when unemployment insurance transfers are higher or are provided for a longer period; the effects of severance pay on unemployment duration are less robust. On the other hand, higher severance pay is found to reduce separation probability, while unemployment insurance transfers have a positive but small effect on separations.

Suggested Citation

  • González Rozada, Martín & Ronconi, Lucas & Ruffo, Hernán, 2011. "Protecting Workers against Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Argentina," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3949, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:3949
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rafael Lalive & Jan Van Ours & Josef Zweimuller, 2006. "How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 1009-1038.
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    5. Katz, Lawrence F. & Meyer, Bruce D., 1990. "The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 45-72, February.
    6. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    7. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    8. Álvarez-Parra, Fernando & Sánchez, Juan M., 2009. "Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(7), pages 954-967, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Protecting Workers against Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Argentina
      by Maximo Rossi in Wikiprogress América Latina on 2012-05-22 21:38:00

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalez-Rozada, Martin & Ruffo, Hernán, 2016. "Optimal unemployment benefits in the presence of informal labor markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 204-227.
    2. Linares Sánchez, Jose, 2020. "Efectos de las prestaciones por desempleo del Mecanismo de Protección al Cesante sobre la probabilidad de ocuparse en la formalidad y sobre la calidad de los emparejamientos [Effects of unemploymen," MPRA Paper 106698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Finkelstein-Shapiro, Alan & Sarzosa, Miguel, 2012. "Unemployement Protection for Informal Workers in Latin America and the Caribbean," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 4542, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. repec:idb:brikps:7203 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Gerard, François & Gonzaga, Gustavo, 2016. "Informal Labor and the Efficiency Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from the Brazilian Unemployment Insurance Program," CEPR Discussion Papers 11485, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Ghorpade,Yashodhan & Franco Restrepo,Camila & Castellanos Rodriguez,Luis Eduardo, 2024. "Social Protection and Labor Market Policies for the Informally Employed : A Review of Evidence from Low- and Middle-Income Countries," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 188471, The World Bank.
    7. -, 2016. "Protección y formación: instituciones para mejorar la inserción laboral en América Latina y Asia," Libros de la CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 40660 edited by Cepal, May.
    8. Janina León C., 2012. "Educación, seguridad social y mercados de trabajo en el Perú," Capítulos de Libros PUCP / Chapters of PUCP books, in: Cecilia Garavito & Ismael Muñoz (ed.), EMPLEO Y PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL, edition 1, chapter 10, pages 331-355, Fondo Editorial - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
    9. Martin Gonzalez-Rozada & Hernan Ruffo, 2014. "The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Under High Informality: Evidence from Argentina," Department of Economics Working Papers wp201403, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    10. Inés Butler & Gabriela Galassi & Hernán Ruffo, 2016. "Public funding for startups in Argentina: an impact evaluation," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 295-309, February.
    11. Verónica Alaimo & Mariano Bosch & David S. Kaplan & Carmen Pagés & Laura Ripani, 2015. "Jobs for Growth," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 90977, February.
    12. Martin González-Rozada & Hernan Ruffo, 2022. "The welfare effects of unemployment insurance in Argentina. New estimates using changes in the schedule of transfers," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022_01, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    13. Andrés Dean & Estefaní­a Galván & Ivone Perazzo, 2014. "¿Acceden al subsidio por desempleo los asalariados rurales en Uruguay? Análisis de la situación actual y simulación de esquemas alternativos," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 14-22, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    14. Mariano Bosch, 2016. "Does unemployment insurance offer incentives to take jobs in the formal sector?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 300-300, October.
    15. Bernardus Van Doornik & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2018. "Unemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment and Firm-Worker Collusion," Working Papers Series 483, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    16. repec:udt:wpecon:2016-03 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Janina León, 2012. "Calificación y Seguridad Social de la Mano de Obra en México," Working Papers 0612, Universidad Iberoamericana, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment insurance; Severance payments; Regression discontinuity; Duration models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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