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Heterogeneity of Central Bankers and Inflationary Pressure

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  • Bugarin, Mauricio
  • Carvalho. Fabia A.

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  • Bugarin, Mauricio & Carvalho. Fabia A., 2006. "Heterogeneity of Central Bankers and Inflationary Pressure," Insper Working Papers wpe_68, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_68
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    File URL: http://www.insper.edu.br/sites/default/files/2006_wpe075.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. Mauricio S. Bugarin & Fabia A. de Carvalho, 2005. "Comment on ‘Market discipline and monetary policy’ by Carl Walsh," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 732-739, October.
    4. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an Optimal Central Bank Contract?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1179-1191, November.
    5. George A. Kahn & Klara Parrish, 1998. "Conducting monetary policy with inflation targets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 83(Q III), pages 5-32.
    6. Cukierman, Alex & Liviatan, Nissan, 1991. "Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 99-127, February.
    7. Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
    8. Walsh, Carl E, 2000. "Market Discipline and Monetary Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 249-271, April.
    9. Frederic S. Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. "One Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?," NBER Working Papers 8397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-455, November.
    11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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