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Spatial Arrangements of Externality Generating and Receiving Activities

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  • Alexander E. Saak

Abstract

Many cases of externalities in agricultural production such as pesticide drift, cross-pollination, and offensive odors are attributable to the incompatibility of neighboring land uses. This paper offers an examination of when an efficient activity arrangement is compatible with free-market incentives. Also, free-market and socially efficient activity arrangements are characterized in terms of spatial concentration of the externality generating uses.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander E. Saak, 2003. "Spatial Arrangements of Externality Generating and Receiving Activities," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications (archive only) 03-wp348, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ias:fpaper:03-wp348
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph A. Herriges & Silvia Secchik & JBruce A. Babcock, 2005. "Living with Hogs in Iowa: The Impact of Livestock Facilities on Rural Residential Property Values," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(4).
    2. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2004. "Social Networks And Crime Decisions: The Role Of Social Structure In Facilitating Delinquent Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 939-958, August.
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