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Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria

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  • Yakov Babichenko

Abstract

We study the problem of reaching Nash equilibria in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: every player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by ?finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash equilibrium is reached in every game where such an equilibrium exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp459, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp459
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    File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp459.pdf
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    1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics And Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 8, pages 165-189, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead To Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 7, pages 153-163, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    Cited by:

    1. Yakov Babichenko, 2010. "Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp529, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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