IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/huj/dispap/dp312.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations

Author

Listed:
  • Ziv Gorodeisky

Abstract

It has been shown (Hart [2002]) that the backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is the unique stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large, under the assumption that the expected number of mutations per generation is bounded away from zero. Here it is shown that one can dispense with this last condition. In particular, it follows that the backward induction equilibrium is evolutionarily stable for large populations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ziv Gorodeisky, 2003. "Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations," Discussion Paper Series dp312, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp312
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp312.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
    2. Hart, Sergiu, 2002. "Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-264, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tomer Wexler, 2005. "Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp402, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Yakov Babichenko, 2018. "Fast Convergence of Best-Reply Dynamics in Aggregative Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(1), pages 333-346, February.
    3. Ziv Gorodeisky, 2005. "Stability of Mixed Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp397, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "A dynamic theory of fidelity networks with an application to the spread of HIV/AIDS," Working Papers 2009-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    2. Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "The Evolution of Bidding Behavior in Private-Values Auctions and Double Auctions," Working Papers wp2007_0712, CEMFI.
    3. Christoph Kuzmics & Daniel Rodenburger, 2020. "A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 685-721, October.
    4. Ziv Gorodeisky, 2005. "Stability of Mixed Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp397, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
    6. Wallace, Chris & Young, H. Peyton, 2015. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    7. Jehiel, Philippe & Samet, Dov, 2005. "Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 129-148, October.
    8. Ben-Shoham, Assaf & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2004. "The evolution of exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 310-328, February.
    9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
    10. Xu, Zibo, 2016. "Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 21-54.
    11. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2004. "The simple geometry of perfect information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(3), pages 315-338, June.
    12. Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2003. "On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-098/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Herold, Florian, 2003. "Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics 40, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    14. Kuzmics, Christoph, 2011. "On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 452-466, June.
    15. Lindgren, Kristian & Verendel, Vilhelm, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma--The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," MPRA Paper 43662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Kristian Lindgren & Vilhelm Verendel, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-20, January.
    17. Kuzmics, Christoph, 2004. "Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 321-336, August.
    18. Christian Hilbe & Moshe Hoffman & Martin A. Nowak, 2015. "Cooperate without Looking in a Non-Repeated Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-15, September.
    19. Noldeka, G. & Samuelson, L., 1994. "Learning to Signal in Market," Working papers 9409, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    20. Jehiel, Philippe, 1998. "Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 274-298, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary Dynamics; Evolutionary Stability; Markov Chains; Transition Times; Backward Induction Equilibrium; Large Populations;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael Simkin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crihuil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.